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IAC-D-29/1

5 September 1951

PROPOSED ANNEX 6 TO THE NSC PAPER
ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS
FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY

1. There is attached hereto a draft Annex 6 to be submitted to the NSC for inclusion with a revision of "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC 68/4).

2. The IAC is reminded of the Annex 6 on intelligence which was submitted with the original NSC 68 and of the progress report which was submitted as approved by the IAC (IAC-D-29) which eventually came out under NSC 114.

3. The NSC Directive for the development of the present study requests a review of the current programs including analysis of difficulties encountered and recommendations regarding any revisions or modifications.

4. It is not possible to define intelligence programs in the same way that war production programs or military or economic aid programs may be defined nor are the sums of money involved of the same magnitude. This paper attempts to point out this difference and to state in the broad sense what the intelligence program is, describing developments in regard thereto and some of the difficulties encountered.

5. In view of the fact that this Annex is due at the NSC Staff on 10 September this paper is placed on the IAC agenda for urgent consideration at the meeting on Thursday, 6 September.

Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

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1. However intently we strive toward the fulfillment of goals in military buildup, foreign aid, and arms production, the adequacy of this effort will hinge in large part upon the accuracy with which we compute the capabilities of the USSR and its satellites, thereafter upon the efficiency with which we estimate their intentions. To calculate that Soviet strength, to anticipate the uses to which it may be put, where and when and under what circumstances, is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence and the national intelligence system. Every shred and source of information must be exploited if it is to yield the data we seek and thus help us to perceive the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet as well as the vulnerabilities of other nations. Most important, however, is the quality of this information, the quality and comprehensiveness of intelligence research and the character of the estimates derived from both.

2. Because of the peculiar nature of intelligence operations, it becomes difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of the increased probity intelligence must attain. Improvement in the integrity of the intelligence

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product is dependent not only upon increased production and collection of foreign intelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and upon the intellectual competence with which it is interpreted in the preparation of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is personnel--personnel recruitment, training, and utilization.

3. Intensification of covert related activities can be more specifically programmed. However, the unique nature of such undertakings precludes detailed examination here. Although adequate funds have been budgeted for support of these related activities, difficulties in the recruitment and training of both U. S. and foreign personnel restrict the rate of expansion. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of construction. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in related activities. A sizable proportion of that strength will consist of uniformed personnel from the armed forces.

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4. To improve the integrity of its intelligence product, the national intelligence system must focus added emphasis upon three essential parts of its program:

First, it must make certain that substantive targets in research, field activity, and estimates are in support of both present and anticipated political and military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.

Second, it must make certain under the existing division of responsibility among intelligence agencies of the government that the resources and activities of each are so synchronized as to provide for maximum support.

Third, it must constantly re-assess and strengthen the capabilities and resources of each of the component members of the intelligence system.

5. It is especially important that we achieve maximum effectiveness in the collection facilities of the national intelligence system. Efforts are being made in this direction particularly in the refining of what is to be collected and in what priority. This need is especially acute in clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties, hazards, and costs exercise serious limitations on what we might expect from such sources.

6. Important beginnings have been made during the last year on a systematic analysis of the Soviet and its satellite economies. At the same time progress has been made in the sifting of extra-governmental projects in basic economic research. Economic analysis has become a critical factor in any meaningful appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It likewise suggests possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by

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exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its satellites to political and economic undertakings.

7. Increasingly closer correlation is required between intelligence agencies and policy planners in the executive agencies of government. If maximum use is to be made of intelligence, both collecting and estimating offices should be apprised of incipient policy decisions. For unless timely notification is provided, intelligence agencies may be handicapped in their endeavor to provide the support they may be capable of rendering.

8. In the coordination of intelligence among departmental agencies within the intelligence system, Central Intelligence monitors the activities of each with its consent and concurrence to ascertain that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time it acts to prevent dissipation of effort in the overlapping or encroaching of one agency upon the roles and prerogatives of another. Central Intelligence is likewise charged with responsibility for services of common concern as well as those services which can be most advantageously exercised centrally. While progress has been made in this process of synchronization, there is still further need for improving and developing new arrangements for working together in even closer cooperation.

9. By making increasingly greater use of the Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each of the departmental intelligence agencies, jurisdictional issues have been more facilely resolved and a valuable

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forum established for consultation and exchange of opinion among intelligence chiefs. In the machinery provided by this committee the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can comment upon, alter, concur, or object to recommendations, proposals, or conclusions regarding day-by-day problems of national intelligence concern.

Equally important has been the role of the IAC in the production of national estimates. After assembling and fusing the contributions of each intelligence agency, CIA drafts, in cooperation with each, a national intelligence estimate on the situation. The final draft of this estimate is then subjected to the scrutiny of the IAC itself for concurrence, revision, or dissent. Thus this final processing insures that each estimate shall accurately reflect the viewpoints and reservations of each separate agency within the intelligence system. And as a result each estimate that is produced is the product of the national intelligence system rather than of the agency in which final synthesis takes place.

10. To guard against political or military surprise there has been created an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically those current indications which might forecast critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission of these indications are constantly being improved.

11. With the buildup in U. S. military forces overseas, it has become necessary to review the working relationships that exist between military authorities and CIA field personnel. Although existing relationships have

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been improved, mutually satisfactory arrangements on the projected activities of CIA in wartime theaters of operations have yet to be achieved.

12. In the projection of intelligence programs, it is anticipated that more and more critical information within the USSR and its satellites must be sought by covert and clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of clandestine operations are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration. No problems are anticipated in budgetary support for the added costliness of such operations. And while intelligence personnel goals are ambitious, it is anticipated they can be met.

13. Lack of sufficient; secure, and convenient space in which to house intelligence headquarters activities have taxed several of the agencies in their effectiveness and jeopardized the security of their undertakings. Within CIA, however, this strain is expected to be eased with construction of a headquarters building designed to house securely the anticipated personnel strength of that agency for FY 1953. Funds have been authorized and construction, it is anticipated, may be completed in eighteen months.

14. Current planning for the improvement and intensification of intelligence and related activities is believed adequate and satisfactory results are anticipated within the period under review.

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